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Introduction 
 
Realist forms of economic theory acknowledge that any movement (such as prices or 
quantities going up or down) requires a temporal sequence of events, which makes it 
possible to specify causation in real historical time. The net outcome of many 
processes and mechanisms, however, can often be known only after the event 
(Robinson 1980). This seems to establish an asymmetry between explanation and 
prediction. We may be able to explain the past, but not predict the future. 
 
Some risks may be calculable, but the future as a whole seems characterized by 
uncertainty. J.M. Keynes theorized uncertainty in his early work on probability 
(2008/1920) and then relied on this concept in his General Theory (1961/1936). Even 
when some economic regularities or functions (such as propensity to consume) 
appear stable in a given historical context, they may change in the future. This is a 
manifestation of what is called the problem of induction in the empiricist philosophy 
of science. Keynes discussed this problematic also in terms of probabilities. If 
probabilities are not stable and fundamental uncertainty prevails (as Keynes 
1961/1936 is usually read), it is difficult to say much about the future and certainly 
impossible to assign well-defined probabilities to possible futures (for a discussion on 
different concepts of uncertainty in economics, see Dequech 2011). At the same time, 
Keynes assumed that the formation of expectations is governed by loose empirical 
regularities related to the mass psychology of markets and investment moods. Waves 
of optimism and pessimism are part of business cycles in capitalist market economy, 
which indicates that expectations can have a self-fulfilling character. 
 
Although Keynes acknowledged that anticipations can have an effect on the 
anticipated events and processes, he did not employ the terminology of reflexivity or 
self-altering prediction. The term “self-fulfilling prophecy” was coined by sociologist 
Robert K. Merton. Its logical counterpart is a self-denying prophecy, a prediction that 
alters the future against the original prediction. As an example of self-fulfilling 
prophecy, Merton (1948) discussed for example the case of a run on the Last National 
Bank in 1932. Merton’s generic point was that public definitions of a situation 
involving anticipations of the future (prophecies, predictions) tend to become an 
integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments. He also 
asserted that the situation-definition may be false but by evoking new behaviour, it 
will subsequently become true (Merton 1948, 195). In other words, behaviour based 
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on false beliefs can generate a social situation that would seem to accord with those 
false beliefs. 
 
Whereas economists have usually been keen to improve the accuracy of their 
professional predictions about GDP growth, unemployment, inflation and so on, 
many social scientists have been more interested in breaking the circle in which false 
lay actor anticipations sustain unnecessary, unneeded and unwanted social practices 
or structures. A social scientist may nonetheless be trying to predict the outcome of 
elections; and an economist may be interested in mitigating business cycles and 
related waves of optimism and pessimism. Either way, self-altering anticipations can 
generate complex combinations of self-fulfilling and self-denying tendencies 
occurring in open systems and in tandem with other mechanisms.  
 
The 1970s was a break point for the Bretton Woods and related established economic 
policies. A series of political decisions and choices contributed to a rupture of 
existing institutional structures and their constellation in the world economy. At this 
time reflexivity moved to the forefront of economic theorisation. Economist Charles 
Goodhart explored the effects of the “competition and credit control” reforms that 
had been introduced in the UK in September 1971, removing direct controls on bank 
lending (the 1975 paper was republished e.g. in Courakis 1981). These reforms broke 
down the previously stable “money demand function”. The money demand function 
was taken as an empirical regularity and useful control mechanism for monetary 
policy. Goodhart mentioned in passing a “Goodhart’s Law”, according to which “any 
observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for 
control purposes” (Goodhart 1981, 116). The collapse can be due to individuals 
trying to anticipate the effect of a policy and then taking actions which alter its 
outcome. 
 
Robert Lucas highlighted a similar but more general problem in econometrics. In his 
1976 paper, Robert Lucas claimed that any change in policy will alter the structure of 
econometric models. A key belief in the 1960s and 1970s was that there is a simple 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment (the so-called “Phillips curve”). But 
reflexivity matters. From the “Lucas-critique” point of view, the problem with the 
Phillips curve is that permanently raising inflation in the hope that this would lower 
unemployment would over time cause firms’ inflation forecasts to rise, altering 
negatively their employment decisions and causing inflation to accelerate.  
 
David F. Hendry has tried to respond to the “Lucas-critique” from a realist angle by 
arguing that economies constitute dynamic complex processes. Dynamic complex 
processes “are often subject to major institutional, political, financial, and 
technological changes which manifest themselves as structural breaks in econometric 
models relative to the underlying data generation process” (Clements and Hendry 
1999, 123). Hendry claims that these structural breaks can be included in econometric 
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models. Some critics argue that economists such as Goodhart, Lucas and Hendry fail 
to take into account the more fundamental ontological point concerning the nature of 
being. All social systems are open and closed to a degree; and these systems include 
reflective actors that have the capacity to act otherwise (for discussions, see Lawson 
1997, 71-4; Chick & Dow 2005; Pratten 2005; Patomäki 2010).  
 
It is not only that the net effect of many processes and mechanisms can often be 
known only afterwards; it is also that qualitative changes are possible through 
learning and structural and institutional changes. Social sciences themselves are 
regularly involved in these qualitative changes, especially through reflexive self-
regulation of social systems. We can talk about reflexive self-regulation when claims 
about the way the social system functions are applied recursively in interventions, 
aiming at avoiding unwanted or achieving desired outcomes (cf. Giddens 1979, 78-
81). From reflexive self-regulation follows also the performativity thesis: economics 
conditions, shapes and constitutes the economy, rather than simply describing it 
(MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu 2007).  
 
George Soros (2008; 2013) has stressed the role of reflexive feedback loops (for a 
friendly critique, see Lawson 2015, ch 9). Participants’ views and theories condition, 
shape and constitute but never fully determine events and processes; “while the 
course of events and processes influences but does not determine the participants’ 
views and theories” (Soros, 2013, 313). As participants are not equal, some views and 
theories are more influential than others. Reflexivity is closely connected to 
fallibility. All views and theories are liable to be biased, incomplete, or both. Soros 
discusses “the efficient market hypothesis” that has not only legitimated 
financialization1, but has also constituted specific market practices and institutions. 
The increasingly prominent index-tracking funds provide an example of market 
practice that is inspired and based on the efficient market hypothesis (MacKenzie 
et.al. 2007, 4 et.passim.). Soros claims that financial markets are characterised by 
positive self-reinforcing reflexive loops driving participants’ views and the real 
situation further apart. The widening of the discrepancy cannot continue forever. A 
self-reinforcing boom is then followed by a bust – as in the crash of 2008. 
 
I begin by discussing predictions and their accuracy in the light of Goodhart’s law 
and Lucas-critique. In that context, I also examine Hendry’s econometric response in 
a bit more detail and introduce the concept of contrastive demi-regularity. When the 
social reality is changing we need to know also what exactly is changing and why. I 
                                           
1 Financialization refers to the processes by which finance markets, finance institutions, and the elites involved in 
financing gain increasing hold over both private economic processes and public economic policymaking. 
Financialization involves deregulation and the growing scale and profitability of finance vis-à-vis the rest of the 
economy. (See e.g. Palley 2013). Van der Zwan (2014) distinguishes between three basic approaches to analyzing 
financialization: (1) the emergence of a new regime of accumulation; (2) the ascendency of the shareholder value 
orientation; and (3) the financialization of everyday life. 
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approach these questions by analysing two significant real-world historical examples, 
the Euro crisis and global financial crises. Both examples involve reflexive 
predictions, reflexive feedback loops and performativity. What I find particularly 
striking is how the capitalist market economy – with all the historical shifts and 
changes in its institutions, regulations and political structures – has managed to retain 
at least some of its recurrent economic patterns.  
 
Next, I examine the general methodological problem of the absence of decisive tests 
between theories. This has consequences: normative and ideological positions evolve 
easily and tend to fortify themselves rapidly; and actors can modify, perhaps 
inadvertently, their public anticipations in line with their interests or normative aims. 
In the final section, I argue that the main aim of social sciences is not to predict 
accurately but to bring about desirable outcomes, explaining how to move from 
strategic actions and reflexive ideologies to emancipation. 
 
 
Reflexivity, policy and changing social realities 
 
Rational economic policy requires at least some predictive capacities. A choice of 
policy from a set {p1, p2, p3 …} presupposes knowledge about the possible and likely 
consequences of p1, p2, and so on. In Keynes’ theory, a key statistical regularity that 
can be used for predictive purposes concerns the multiplier effect of investments and 
public expenditure. In chapter 10 of General Theory, Keynes used the following 
estimates: marginal propensity to consume 0.8; the consumption rate for the 
unemployed is half of normal; and foreign trade accounts for 20% of the national 
income. On the basis of these rough facts, he estimated the multiplier in the 1930s 
UK should be in the order of 2-3. Every extra pound injected into the economy would 
yield an increase of 2-3 pounds in national product. Keynes stressed, however, that 
the multiplier depends on a number of historically changing connections within an 
interdependent economy. A large number of variables take part in determining the 
multiplier, directly or indirectly. Government policy and public investments have 
effects on many of them, for instance on interest rates and on general “confidence” 
and thereby on liquidity preference and marginal efficiency of capital. 
 
The idea that policy can have an impact on economic events and processes and their 
relationships was thus not new in 1975 when Goodhart wrote his famous paper 
“Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience” (published also as 
Goodhart 1981). Until 1971, the pound had been pegged to the US dollar and this 
self-imposed constraint largely dictated monetary policy. The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971 coincided with domestic reasons to reform the UK monetary 
system. In the few years before the “competition and credit control” reforms, the 
main money aggregates varied in a fairly consistent way with money incomes and 
interest rates. This seemed to indicate that the UK monetary authorities could use 
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changes in the money stock to have a predictable effect on money incomes or on 
interest rates. They could also control the monetary aggregates through the price 
mechanism and stable demand-for-money function by lowering or raising interest 
rates. However, after the reform, banks changed their behaviour, reducing margins 
drastically to compete for market shares and increasing lending massively, especially 
to companies. This reveals that the demand-for-money function depends on the 
behaviour of banks and is dependent on the geo-historical context. Authorities’ 
counter-measures were soon overtaken by other independent forces within the UK 
financial system, especially those related to the boom-and-bust cycle in the housing 
markets. This illustrates how, in open systems, the effects of historically evolving 
forms of agency, forces and tendencies can be delayed, overlapping, mutually-
reinforcing and/or contradictory. 
 
It is not clear that the problem in 1971-5 in the UK stemmed from the pressure placed 
upon the demand-for-money function for control purposes. Deregulation led UK 
banks to change the rationale of their actions quite independently of the control 
purposes by the state. What matters is that Goodhart recognised that social realities 
change. Similarly, Lucas (1976) started his critique of empirical macroeconomic 
modelling by pointing out how econometricians rely on adaptive modelling, giving 
more weight on recent than distant experiences. Adaptive econometric modelling 
gives a better empirical fit, but it also indicates that the temporally distant data is less 
relevant and potentially misleading. The obvious explanation of this econometric 
practice is that because actors, practices, policies and institutions are changing over 
time, only recent experiences are really applicable. Lucas is interested in the role of 
state-policy. The crux of his argument is that any intervention such as a policy change 
affects the expectations and actions of the actors. What Lucas has been able to show 
is that the probabilistic relationships identified in econometric models are unstable 
(Lawson 1997, 69-85). Contra Lucas, however, the way and extent to which 
expectations and actions change are contingent and must be examined empirically.2 
Moreover, actors’ views can be contradictory and are subject to fallibility.  
 
Any combination of self-fulfilling and self-denying tendencies occurring in open 
systems and in tandem with other social forces, tendencies and mechanisms is in 
principle possible. A “compensated” prediction tries to take into account also 
reactions to the prediction itself (cf. Grunberg & Modigliani 1954; Simon 1954). 
Attempts to anticipate responses to predictions or regulations or changes in policies 
are subject to uncertainty, and anticipations may thus fail. The overall net result may 
                                           
2 Lucas proposed both a practical and theoretical solution to the ensuing problem of instability, which he assumed to be 
a problem that must be overcome. The practical solution was economic policy based on fixed and consistent rules rather 
than discretion. The theoretical idea was to rely on “rational expectations”. Lucas and his followers have thus contended 
that responses to changes in policy are well understood and predictable. Moreover, the lay-actors are assumed to have 
perfect foresight. Lucas’s practical solution has had a major impact on economic policy-making across the world and 
thus is a good example of the performativity of economic theory. His theoretical solution contradicts the epistemic 
principle of fallibility, however, and is thus utterly implausible.  
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be either to increase or decrease predictive accuracy. Different cases can be 
distinguished depending on the dominant self-altering tendency and whether the 
prediction takes form of ordinal or scalar prediction, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of prediction form and dominant self-altering tendency on predictive 
accuracy 
 
 
Prediction form 
 
Dominant self-altering tendency 
 
 Net self-fulfilling 
tendency 
Net self-denying 
tendency 
 
Ordinal prediction 
• direction of change 
• passing a benchmark 
• rank order 
 
Increases accuracy 
 
 
Decreases accuracy 
 
 
 
Scalar prediction 
 
Uncertain effect on 
accuracy 
 
Decreases accuracy 
 
Source: Henshel 1993, 98 
 
 
For instance, a credible forecast of increased inflation is published by a central bank, 
ministry or research institute. This can bring about both self-denying (monetary and 
financial countermeasures by the government and central bank) and self-fulfilling 
responses (workers increase wage demands, corporations increase prices). If the net 
effect is self-fulfilling and the prediction is ordinal, these responses will increase the 
accuracy of the forecast. If the prediction is scalar and takes the form of precise 
number within a given time-interval, however, the effect on accuracy is uncertain, as 
the prediction may also cause an “overshoot”. If the net tendency is self-denying, 
then accuracy is always decreased, independently of whether the prediction is ordinal 
or scalar. In this example, the purposefully self-denying policy responses are then 
subject to the instability diagnosed by Goodhart and Lucas, but in a manner that is 
not reducible to any simple predictable scheme or canon of economic theory.3   
However, the significance of this instability is contingent and context-dependent. 
                                           
3 Lucas relies for instance on Milton Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis, which he takes as an established 
part of the canon of economic theory. In practice, it is quite tricky to test Friedman’s hypothesis because it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to distinguish between predictable and permanent income changes from other income changes. 
Friedman himself used contradictory definitions: sometimes only the subjective assumptions of people matter; at other 
times the current wealth or past income matter, defining rational expectations about the future. By appropriately 
manipulating the definition and data, any desired result can be achieved. The real question is to what extent do people in 
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Several economists have accepted instability and yet defend the use of statistical 
techniques (e.g. Sims, Goldfeld and Sachs 1982). The main claim is that although 
econometric projections are only conditional, they can be useful in policy analysis. 
Robert J. Gordon (1976, 57) argues further that “it may be possible in some cases to 
either deduce or estimate the shifts in parameters in response to policy changes”. 
Hendry (1983; 1985) has developed methods that can identify structural breaks, 
regime shifts and technological and financial innovations by means of econometric 
models and in future scenarios. This is important not least because these breaks and 
shifts tend to go hand in hand with episodes of dramatic predictive failure. Hendry’s 
approach is explicit about not requiring closed systems (conditions similar to 
laboratory experiments, where the effects of one transfactual causal mechanism can 
be isolated and studied separately) and it allows for changes in parameters. The 
complex process generating data is local. Partly by identifying what is relatively 
constant in the process and partly by using insights from theory and practice, it is 
plausible to design a model that can be used as a tool in policy-making.  
 
Hendry (1997) has also built methods of forecasting in a situation where there may be 
discrepancy between the model and the changing social world. There is no practical 
use of a model, however, when its key parameters are not stable, not even locally. 
Hendry (ibid. 1331) points out that the success of econometric model-based forecasts 
depends upon there being regularities that are informative about the future. In 
addition, we should be able to exclude non-regularities that swamp the regularities. A 
further problem of econometric modelling is that given the nature of available data 
and the absence of robust relations between variables, correlation- and regression-
analysis may rely on measuring something with precision that is not precise at all 
(Martins 2018, 231-2). These points bring us back to the ontological question.  
 
Tony Lawson (1997, 204-13) has introduced the concept of contrastive demi-
regularity, indicating the existence of partial closures also in society. Contrastive 
demi-regularities concern contrasts between categories or spacetime areas and are 
expressed in terms of regularities within a given range of variation with certain 
probability. They are not strict regularities but probabilistic, limited to a particular 
spacetime area, and liable to change with the underlying structures and mechanisms. 
Lawson argues that it is not sufficient to find contrastive demi-regularities and, then, 
specify the conditions of their continuation. Rather, there should be a movement 
towards analysing the deeper social structures and causal mechanisms generating 
                                           
practice calculate their consumption according to the expectations of tens of years? Of course, people’s consumption 
can exhibit stability and planning to some extent. Expected short-term fluctuations can be offset by debt or savings. 
People adjust their consumption to others” consumption and often try to mimic the wealthier. Keynes, however, argued 
that in practice, many people consume roughly a standard part of their income, although standards also change over 
time, and this claim has support from both everyday experiences and empirical studies. See Keynes 1961/1936, 89-131; 
Wilcox 1989; and Chao 2000. For a more human and social hypothesis about relative incomes, see Duesenberry 1949; 
and for a strong-worded criticism of Friedman’s biased practices of empirical research, see Herman 1995, 34-37. 
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these manifest phenomena. Systems are nonetheless characterised by some continuity 
and stability at the empirical level as well. 
 
Contra Lawson’s theoretical and practical intentions, it may be reasonable to search 
for contrastive demi-regularities also as partial guidance to and illumination about 
possible and likely short- to mid-term futures. Contrastive demi-regularities are 
pervasive also in relatively open systems, and many aspects of world futures are very 
difficult to study systematically without a resort to some extrapolation. Although not 
the only task of future-oriented social science, the anticipation of possible and likely 
outcomes of actions, policies and regulatory and institutional changes is an important 
part of what rational social science should be doing. The real choice is between the 
use of (i) formal but only relatively and ambiguously adequate statistical methods and 
(ii) informal methods, including conceptual models that may involve some numerical 
values; theory-laden extrapolation; leading indicators; expert discussions and 
judgements, and so on. These options may also be seen as complementary. 
 
 
Reflexivity, regime shifts and structural changes in global finance 
 
When the social reality is changing we also need to know what exactly is changing 
and why. To what extent, and when exactly, may self-altering predictions be 
sufficient for structural changes in the economy? In what ways are policy- and 
regime-shifts constituted by reflexive feedback loops and by performativity? How 
may these be related to technological and financial innovations? By answering these 
questions we are in a better position to anticipate the instability diagnosed by 
Goodhart and Lucas. Perhaps we could even anticipate the direction of likely 
responses, thus increasing our reflexive predictive capabilities. I approach these 
questions by analysing two significant real-world historical examples, the Euro crisis 
and global financial crises (especially 2008-9 and the next one).  
 
The Euro crisis: the role of institutionalised reflexivity 
 
The establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union in the Maastricht Treaty 
constituted a major regime shift in Europe. The EMU design, developed in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, drew heavily on the ideas of monetarism, supply side 
economics and new classical macroeconomics, which came into vogue in the wake of 
changing circumstances (the partial collapse of the Bretton Woods system) and 
various intellectual developments (such as Lucas-critique). Established in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Central Bank sets interest rates, aiming for low 
inflation within the single market of the EU. No other common economic policy is 
deemed necessary.  
 
10 
 
The expectation derived from abstract theory is that if economic policy is rule-based 
and price levels can be kept stable, economic growth will be strong and income levels 
in the whole of Europe will converge over the long term. This idea is based on new 
classical macroeconomic models developed in the 1970s and in vogue in the 1980s 
(on the 1970s neoclassical theories in which European Central Bank monetary policy 
is rooted, see e.g. Lucas 1972; Barro 1974; Sargent & Wallace 1975). These models 
imply that market actors’ perfect knowledge and rational expectations inevitably 
obviate (most of) the effects of Keynesian economic policy. Active economic policies 
can only serve to bring about higher inflation, an undesirable outcome. A further 
assumption was that well-functioning labour markets would even out regional 
differences, resulting in a balanced and affluent EU. 
 
The short-lived process of apparent economic convergence ended in the global 
financial crisis of 2008-9. The global economic crisis triggered automatic stabilizers 
in the EU countries. Many of the countries also resorted to deliberate increases in 
national expenses to stimulate the economy. These expenses were paid off with new 
public debt, which was also used to shore up the rapidly depleting reserves of banks 
and investors. The euro crisis started when the rising levels of public debt triggered 
new credit assessments, negative market reactions and EMU’s disciplinary 
mechanisms. (For the full story involving major design flaws and imbalances in the 
composition of efficient demand in the EU, see Patomäki 2013, ch 4.)  
 
The key idea of the EMU is to discipline public finances through market mechanisms 
and to control the supply of money so as to keep inflation as low as possible. If public 
sector budgets are not in balance, the state or municipality must take on debt from the 
private sector, thereby making themselves vulnerable to interest rate increases. Even 
though Eurozone countries are still free to borrow on the domestic market, they have 
no control over the interest rates, which are determined in the financial markets. 
Transnational commercial banks set their own margins for the loans, based on their 
profit goals and on their assessment of the risk involved in granting the loan. Because 
the European Central Bank refused, in the beginning of the euro crisis, to intervene in 
market developments, for example by ensuring specific interest rates for certain 
Eurozone countries, market logic determined the price levels on the bond market.  
 
Despite their convoluted nature, the difference stages of the finance game can be 
reduced to a fairly schematic chain, which can easily generate self-fulfilling 
predictions. During the euro crisis, the speculation chain went as follows (see Centre 
for Research on Multinational Corporations 2011; Patomäki, 2013, 75-6): 
 
→ Investment banks, for example Goldman Sachs or Deutsche Bank, and various 
hedge funds buy up credit default swaps — derivatives that function as 
guarantees against credit risk — in case Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, or 
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some other country becomes insolvent. These swaps can be bought even if the 
investors who buy them have no bonds issued by the countries in question. 
→ Increased demand for credit default swaps is interpreted as a sign that the 
economic situation in the country in question is deteriorating.  
→ Credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, react to the 
increased demand for bad credit swaps and reduce the creditworthiness rating 
of the country in question.  
→ The credit rating agencies’ intervention raises the price of the credit default 
swaps, which makes it possible for speculators to make short-term profits, 
which increases the demand for swaps still further. 
→ Banks with bonds issued by a crisis-hit country become alarmed and begin to 
sell off the bonds. In some cases, they are legally obliged to sell bonds if their 
value drops below a certain level, since retaining them would increase risk of 
loss to the banks.  
→ If the crisis countries’ bond prices drop significantly in value, it becomes 
profitable to “sell them short”. Short-selling means that speculators first 
borrow the assets from some party and sells them at the going market price. 
Once the price drops, speculators buy the same assets back and then “return” 
them to the lender. Short selling strengthens the tendencies of assets to 
depreciate.  
→ The outcome of all the foregoing stages is that the crisis country finds itself in 
a situation in which it can renew its loans only by agreeing to exorbitant 
interest rates, as high as twenty or thirty percent or even much more (interest 
rates can climb up to hundreds of percent). This dramatically worsens its debt 
situation. 
 
Overall, this is a system of circular causal relations. A relatively small change in one 
item initiates a sequence of events affecting others, eventually returning to affect the 
item that began the sequence in a self-reinforcing manner. The causal forces in this 
loop do not operate blindly but rather involve self-regulation through feedback via 
the operation of selective information filtering and interpretations (based on 
particular technical concepts and theories of finance and economy). The feedback 
takes the form of predictions that affect credit ratings and market valuations and tend 
to be self-fulfilling. The system as a whole is based on reflexive self-regulation to the 
extent that it is purposefully employed in order to discipline public finances through 
market mechanisms. The system also generates unintended consequences such as 
financial crises that would not occur in the absence of this causal loop. 
 
Within the prevailing framework, however, the deep crisis of several Eurozone 
countries was usually interpreted as a moral failure of the governments and as 
weakness of EMU discipline. The main exception has been European Central Bank’s 
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“unconventional monetary policy”, starting with the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) programme that was announced by the Bank’s Governing Council in August 
2012. The ECB promised to use central bank money to buy bonds from the secondary 
market as needed. Since the central bank can easily create money, the sale of bonds is 
now guaranteed. This has calmed the money market and helped to keep interest rates 
relatively low, although the crisis in its various phases continued until 2015, with a 
weak and fragile recovery starting in 2016.  
 
The course of events in the process known as the Euro crisis have influenced actual 
policy (ECB) without, however, altering the main participants’ (the troika, the 
Eurogroup, mainstream economists) views about the underlying economic and 
political theories.4 In line with the prevailing theoretical framework, a number of new 
institutional arrangements have been introduced or put in place: the stability 
mechanism, the “six-pack”, the “two-pack”, the European Fiscal Compact and the 
euro plus. Both “preventive” and “correcting” mechanisms of these arrangements rely 
largely on economic forecasts, which without planning are difficult to carry out and 
make corrections. For instance, the 2012 European Fiscal Compact involves concepts 
such as “structural deficit”, “cyclically adjusted debt-to-GDP ratio” and “Medium-
Term Budgetary Objective” (MTO), which all make references to the future: 
 
In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the 
adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically (Council 
of the European Union 2012, 6). 
 
The Compact stipulates that the government budget should either be balanced or in 
surplus. It introduces the concept of the structural balance, which refers to the 
budgetary position of the state when adjusted for cyclical effects, based on estimates 
of potential GDP. The structural balance ought to converge with the country-specific 
medium-term objective according to a timetable set by the Commission. Signatories 
must also set up automatic correction mechanisms at the national level, preferably in 
the constitution to ensure that any deviations are quickly corrected. States breaching 
deficit limits need to put forward a plan for structural reforms, assessed by the 
Commission and the Council. If a member state is in an excessive deficit procedure, 
the matter can be brought to the European Court of Justice, who can impose sanctions 
up to 0.1% of the GDP of the deviant state (Council of the European Union 2012, 8). 
 
Each member state must specify which institute is responsible for the economic 
forecasts used in their calculations. The authority of the last resort in this regard lies, 
                                           
4 It is noteworthy that the concept of uncertainty can itself become an obstacle to learning, as seems to be the case for 
instance with the Bank of England after the global financial crisis 2008-9. As Nasir and Morgan argue (2018, 21), “the 
use of uncertainty as a justification can become a barrier, which short-circuits learning because theory and method do 
not respond to failure at a fundamental level. This seems a very basic contradiction for central banking, the nature of an 
open system periodically undermines forecasting, but forecasting is insulated from assimilating this insight because of 
the use to which a concept of uncertainty as unavoidable error can be put in an open [and reflexive] system.” 
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however, with the EU Commission itself. Forecasts affect economic policy, in turn 
affecting economic developments. Forecasts are thus not independent of what 
possibilities will be actualised. Predictions or forecasts can be “optimistic” or 
“pessimistic” depending on what is assumed to be normal as well as on what 
normative aims are implicit in the background theories (e.g. downsizing the public 
sector).5 Predictions of low economic growth in the future are thus likely to become 
self-fulfilling. For ordinal predictions, this will increase their accuracy, but for 
cardinal predictions, the effect is uncertain because of the possibility of overshoot. 
 
A key issue in this system is that attempts to reduce public debt can turn out to be 
self-defeating and recessionary. Through cuts in public expenditure, disposable 
income is reduced thus potentially inducing or worsening an economic recession 
through the multiplier effect. This, in turn, leads to decreased tax receipts and 
increased expenditure due to the workings automatic stabilisers, such as 
unemployment benefits. When combined with a fall in GDP, this increase in 
expenditure results in an increase of debt-to-GDP ratio, potentially leading to a 
vicious cycle. Crucially however, whether this dynamic is played out depends on the 
policies of other actors in the system and the prevailing phase of the business cycle, 
which is not independent of these policies though not reducible to them. Overall, this 
system is an example of institutionalised reflexive loop that is geared toward an 
implicit political aim involving a high likelihood of net self-fulfilling tendency 
toward harmful socio-economic outcomes (to be analysed in more detail below). 
 
Global financial crises: the role of recurring patterns 
 
The Euro crisis was instigated by the global financial crisis of 2008-9, a dramatic 
example of a crash following worldwide bubble. The boom-and-bust cycle involves 
reflexive feedback loops. According to Soros (2013, 323; see also Soros 2008), a 
boom-bust process is set in motion when a trend and a misconception about it 
positively reinforce each other. Behaviour based on false beliefs – in the 2000s 
actively supported by the majority of economists – contributes to a trend that would 
seem to accord with those false beliefs. The course of events and processes in 
financial markets reinforces participants’ views (“bull market”) and theories 
(“efficient market hypothesis”). Reflexivity works also through changes in the 
economy itself, not only via beliefs. For instance, the value of homeowners’ or 
investors’ collateral is not independent of the availability of credit. When credit 
                                           
5 For instance, projections by the Commission in the spring of 2018, during a period of economic growth, forecasted 
that Romania will have the most significant deviation in its structural budget position at -3,8% of potential GDP with 
Hungary at -3,6% as a close second. Both were placed under Significant Deviation Procedures. Surplus countries 
included Greece (2,5%), Germany (1.2%), Sweden (0.7%) and Denmark (0.3%). Italy and France were both predicted 
to have structural deficits at -1.7% and -2.1% respectively. For the euro area as a whole, the Commission forecasted a 
structural budget position at -0.8% of potential GDP in 2018 and -1.1% in 2019. (European Commission 2018, 180) 
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becomes cheaper and more easily available, activity picks up and values rise. The 
amount of credit is at its maximum at the height of the boom.  
 
The boom is sustained not only through evidence from the markets but also by 
“analytical monocultures”, i.e. shared models, metaphors and narratives, creating 
theory-data-theory feedback loops. Uncertainty reinforces this tendency to resort to 
prevailing beliefs and stories and analyse data accordingly. (Bronk 2013; also 
Patomäki 2001, 21-25). Thus constituted expectations can be self-reinforcing for 
years, but the collective consequences of leverage building, mutual indebtment and 
rapidly inflating asset prices mean that the process becomes unsustainable and will 
turn downwards sooner or later (Minsky 2008). Certainty that an inflationary process 
has constituted a bubble can only be established ex post, i.e. after its bust, although ex 
ante indicators and historical analogies often are sufficiently reliable for many 
practical purposes. There are two mechanisms that finally will bring the boom to an 
end. The first has to do with the growing discrepancy between asset values and reality 
understood in terms of how much revenues are really generated (Soros 2013; Shaikh 
2013). The second is that the rising involvement in debt makes the system gradually 
more vulnerable to relatively small disturbances, and thus increasingly chaotic. The 
monetary system is stable only as long as streams of revenue and profit enable firms 
to meet their financial liabilities (Minsky 1982, 22; see also Patomäki 2010)  
 
When the confidence on the prospects of X is gone, the individually rational choice 
of “sell as quickly as you can” can amount to a collectively catastrophic outcome of a 
collapse of asset values although overall most investors would be better off by not 
selling for the time being. Markets involves contradictory tendencies: complicated 
bets can be made on a bust or crash and some may also benefit from “bear markets”. 
A catastrophe occurs when most actors believe that the worst outcome would be to 
stay in now while most others opt out. By not selling as quickly as they can, they 
would be easily left with very little (and for some actors there are specific more 
formal mechanisms, such as covenant breaches and collateral margin calls creating 
“death spirals”). Many assets remain valuable only as long as other cross-invested 
assets remain valuable. If an actor becomes insolvent, it affects many others’ stream 
of revenue as well. Hence, the occasional bursts of panics and busts, with far-
reaching causal consequences to production, employment and welfare. 
 
In the 1970s, a regime shift occurred that led to a structural change increasing 
volatility and enabling positive reflexive loops generating boom-and-bust cycles. 
Since then, the process of financialization has been an on-going process with sporadic 
changes in the way the financial markets operate (after major crises, there have also 
been periods of counter-regulation). Innovations are a part of these shifts and 
changes. Capitalist market economy generates innovations also in finance, not only in 
production and exchange (see Minsky 1982, 2008). New financial instruments and 
other financial innovations presuppose de- and re-regulation, usually justified in 
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terms of “efficient markets”. Financial innovations are in some ways analogical to the 
effects of Schumpeterian innovations, aiming at ensuring something analogical to 
monopoly profits as long as possible (cf. Schumpeter 1939, 87-125).  
 
In financial markets innovations concern first and foremost leverage and the 
management of risk. At least partial secrecy or non-transparency is essential for 
hiding uncertainty, for masquerading uncertainty as calculable risks, and for 
profitably transferring and re-pooling risks. Financial innovations are often also about 
increasing leverage or decreasing the time of the investments or capital requirements, 
both of which mean new risks and uncertainty. Sometimes innovations are needed to 
evade regulations. Arguably, nearly all financial innovations prior to the global crash 
of 2008 were at variance with the common good (e.g. Stiglitz 2010). The overall 
effect of the bulk of financial innovations was to strengthen the unsustainable boom, 
also by making credit easier and finance more fragile, until the crash of 2008.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, it is striking how the capitalist market economy – 
with all the historical shifts and changes in its institutions, regulations and political 
structures – has managed to retain at least some of its recurrent economic patterns 
(Shaikh 2016; see Patomäki 2017)? I have puzzled over this question for nearly two 
decades, since the Asian crisis of 1997–98, and since I first learnt about the tendency 
in capitalist market economy towards financialization, which then gives rise to a 
recurring tendency toward a pattern of booms and busts (see Kindleberger 1978; 
Minsky 1982; Soros 1998; cf. Patomäki 2001, chapter 2). What is especially 
remarkable is that reflexivity and reflexive loops can be part of patterns that tend to 
be recurring over the timespan of centuries (since the 1720 South Sea Company 
crash), making at least some generic things anticipatable at least at some level of 
abstraction. Such recurring patterns also point to lack of long-term rational learning, 
Bayesian or otherwise, further undermining the validity of new classical models. 
 
In contrast to 2006-7, in 2016-18 many well-known analysts and international 
organizations from Deutsche Bank to the IMF have been warning about a future crisis 
that might occur in 2018, but is likely to come about by 2020 (Reid et al 2017; IMF 
2016; IMF 2017; IMF 2018). Anticipations are reflexive and can have effects on the 
future. Moreover, some economists believe that central banks have learnt new lessons 
from their unconventional policies and are now ready and willing to use their – in 
principle unlimited – resources to prevent a financial collapse from happening. Are 
we thus safer in the late 2010s and early 2020s than before? 
 
Past lessons and reflexivity have effects through transforming actions and 
institutions. We are not, however, seeing attempts to counter the process of 
financialization for instance through re-regulation or taxation of global finance, 
reduction of inequalities, or establishing new programmes of stimulating productive 
investments. There are some global initiatives via the Basel Rules and via the 
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international Financial Stability Board but these are highly limited, involving more 
retained capital and centralised systems for derivatives that are based on the premise 
that rational actors with more information (about shadow banking etc.) will render the 
system more robust, enabling more “financial deepening”. This follows variations on 
“efficient markets” frameworks. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is giving 
significant tax benefits to the super-rich and deregulating finance. Even in the EU, the 
project of establishing a financial transaction tax seems to have come to an end, and 
the European financial union is lacking sufficient resources. The rising debt levels in 
China are an increasing global concern, although interpretations about its significance 
differ. Meanwhile, the global bubble in stock and housing markets has been growing, 
although the latter boom may have already seen its peak in summer 2018.6 
 
A lot hinges upon central banks, but they are in a contradictory position, and not only 
because their public predictions tend to be self-fulfilling. The very attempt to tighten 
policy in order to return to the “normal”, to respond to inflation, or to slow down the 
growth of bubbles may set in motion a downward spiral for instance by triggering 
sovereign debt crises or by increasing the burden of debt among investors and home-
owners. And to reiterate, central banks may simultaneously fear that any anticipation 
of tough times may become self-fulfilling. In the absence of adequate common 
policies, regulations and institutions on a global scale, central banks may actually be 
less powerful than often thought. Hence, Minsky’s “it” (the collapse of the financial 
and economic system) seems again rather likely. If my analysis is on the mark, we are 
likely to see a major crash – perhaps even bigger than in 2008, although this is 
uncertain – followed by a global recession or depression, by 2020 or so.7 A precise 
prediction of the timing of the next crisis would make it possible to exploit the crash. 
If acted upon widely, such a prediction could also become self-fulfilling. 
 
 
 
                                           
6 See for instance “There’s trouble ahead in the global housing market”, Business Insider 17 July 2018, available at 
https://www.businessinsider.com/housing-market-prices-about-to-plummet-worldwide-2018-7?r=US&IR=T&IR=T; 
and The End of the Global Housing Boom, Bloomberg News, 1 August 2018, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-31/are-house-prices-falling-from-sydney-to-new-york. 
7 In August 2018, five economists, three of whom (Peter Schiff, Steve Keen and Dean Baker) forecasted ex ante the 
2008 financial crisis, tried to anticipate the shape of things to come. Four of them expect a downturn in the next two 
years or so, in most cases either caused by erroneous central bank policy or a series of local busts; only one of them 
(Peter Schiff) expects a major global crash. For instance, Keen argues that there is no major financial bubble and “China 
is the biggest economy facing a credit crunch, but its huge level of government spending is already softening the blow”. 
See the salon forum “The end really is near: a play-by-play of the coming economic collapse” available at 
https://www.salon.com/2018/08/12/the-end-is-near-a-play-by-play-of-the-coming-economic-collapse/. It seems to me 
that these anticipations underestimate for instance the bubble in stock markets. In summer 2007, Dow Jones index 
almost reached 14,000 points just before the crash; in 2018 it has been above 28,000 points. Meanwhile, the US 
economy has grown only 15% and GDP/capita 6%. On the other hand, FTSE 100 index for example is a mere 16% 
above the summer 2007 peak levels, with corresponding GDP/capita growth of less than 4%. It is also noteworthy that 
in the second quarter of 2018 global debt reached a new peak, climbing to 260 trillion dollars ($260,000 billion); at the 
same time, the global debt to GDP ratio crossed the 320% threshold for the first time (Minenna 2018). 
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Strategically and ideologically motivated predictions in open systems  
 
Often predictive accuracy is not a reasonable aim of social sciences. This is 
especially true when reflexivity is involved. Self-altering predictions can move the 
world into a direction that may or may not be desirable. A net self-fulfilling tendency 
usually – though not always – improves accuracy (see Figure 1), but if the predicted 
outcome is worse than what would have occurred in the absence of the prediction, 
improved accuracy is harmful. A net effect of self-denial decreases accuracy, but this 
is normally good if the self-alteration helps for example to reduce unemployment or 
make growth more sustainable, not to speak of avoiding sudden crises or wars. This 
suggests two somewhat contradictory criteria for an adequate prediction: relevance 
and accuracy, on the one hand, and success in informing practical actions and shaping 
the world, on the other. The contradiction can be mitigated by defining accuracy 
counterfactually: what would have happened in the absence of prediction? 
 
One implication is that self-altering predictions can only be tested and thus falsified 
by means of counterfactual reasoning: what would have happened, had X been 
otherwise? Here X denotes reflexive phenomena such as predictions, but a systems’ 
openness more generally should also be taken into account. Even when the predictive 
analysis of relevant forces and tendencies is valid, in open systems qualitative 
changes or extrinsic interferences may occur in a manner that is not anticipatable, 
including in terms of chances and coincidences. While all causal analysis involves 
counterfactual reasoning (“had X been otherwise, would Y have occurred?”), 
reflexivity and ontological openness of reality introduce a further non-testable 
element into social sciences, making ex post falsification of predictions difficult. This 
reflects and further complicates the general methodological problem of studying open 
systems. The general methodological problem is that in the absence of closure, 
decisive tests between theories are hard to come by. Hence, normative and 
ideological positions evolve easily and tend to fortify themselves rapidly.8  
 
As actors know that anticipations tend to become an integral part of the situation and 
thus affect subsequent developments, including policies, they can modify, perhaps 
inadvertently, their public anticipations in line with their interests or normative aims. 
Consider the case of self-interested strategic predictions. Eerik Lagerspetz (1988, 
309-12) discusses the tendency of energy producers to overestimate future energy 
needs. Lagerspetz depicts a (hypothetical but evidence-based) mechanism that 
generates self-fulfilling prophecies and unnecessarily large energy-production 
                                           
8 From this point of view, Roy Bhaskar (1998, 23, 50, 144) analyses the consequences of the continuing hegemony of 
positivism. Because of the absence of decisive test situations, coupled with continuing one-sided allegiance to a mere 
predictive rather than explanatory and other criteria, the methodology on which one’s research relies gets mystified. The 
dominant or otherwise privileged theory is thereby protected, alternatives are stunted, and there is an encouragement of 
(a belief in) the unresolvability of theoretical conflicts — which, in practice, means their resolution in favour of the 
status quo. I would not go as far as Bhaskar, however, in making the criteria for the rational appraisal and development 
of theories in the social sciences exclusively explanatory. Our predictive powers matter, but in a complicated manner. 
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capacities. The producers predict an increase in consumption and then start to 
increase production as a response to this anticipated need. Consumers, including 
industry, expect cheap energy also in the future because of the growing supply and 
thus increase their consumption. New consumption patterns are adopted. The 
prediction that consumers are going to move into certain direction thus induces the 
predicted move, although it is undesirable from a sustainability viewpoint. 
 
Wishful thinking can shape anticipations also for non-self-interested reasons. It is not 
only that expectations and anticipations can turn out to be self-fulfilling or self-
denying; this may also be part of their very purpose. The performativity of economic 
theory illustrates this problematic. The efficient market hypothesis – not only in the 
context of financial markets (Fama 1970) but also more generally – promises welfare 
gains, if not in the short run then at least in the unspecified, non-historical “long run”, 
from balanced budgets, low inflation, trade-liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, 
outsourcing and several other policies. With hindsight and a firm commitment to the 
theory, it is always possible to find a variety of ad hoc explanations for the 
unintended consequences that these policies tend to have in concrete historical 
contexts. This can result in a closed circle, as summarised in the scheme of Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The closed circle of operation of the efficient market hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Patomäki 2001, 12 
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theory is being vindicated (for instance, mainstream economics was not only unable 
to anticipate the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, but it has also been unable to 
learn from it; see Bigo and Negru 2014; Mirowski 2014; Morgan 2015). In 
accordance with this logic, the usual political solution has been to impose the free 
competitive markets ideal even more vigorously, although some contrary re-
regulation may also occur (indicating that the circle of Figure 2 is not fully closed). 
This methodological and normative problem is not unique to the efficient markets 
hypothesis and like-minded economic theories (see Patomäki, forthcoming), however 
hegemonic they may be during the current era. Reflexivity, performativity and 
openness of social systems pose problems to any episteme.  
 
 
Figure 3: Accuracy, desirability, falsifiability and exploitability of public predictions 
 
Prediction Predicted 
outcome 
Accuracy Falsification Strategic 
exploitation 
Ideological 
exploitation 
Non-self-altering Desirable Useless Relatively 
trouble-free 
Not possible Not possible 
 Non-desirable ”” ”” ”” ”” 
Net effect zero Desirable Useless Requires 
counterfactual 
reasoning 
Possible (what 
outcome is good 
or bad for 
whom?) 
Possible (what 
outcome is 
considered 
good or bad by 
whom?) 
 Non-desirable ”” ”” ”” ”” 
Net self-fulfilling Desirable Helpful ”” ”” ”” 
 Non-desirable Harmful ”” ”” ”” 
Net self-denying Desirable Harmful ”” ”” ”” 
 Non-desirable Helpful ”” ”” ”” 
 
 
 
Thus, what we have is a complicated picture consisting of the direction of self-
alteration; desirability of the counterfactual and actual outcomes; counterfactual 
reasoning and the absence of decisive test situations; and possibility of strategic and 
ideological exploitation of predictions. Figure 3 summarises the key points in terms 
of accuracy, desirability, falsifiability, and exploitability of prediction. Note that in 
the cases of non-self-altering predictions and zero net effect, accuracy may be 
desirable but is practically useless. Whenever reflexivity plays a role, falsification 
requires counterfactual reasoning and is especially difficult. Strategic and ideological 
exploitation of predictions decomposes the desirability of outcome in terms of self-
interested actors and different normative conceptions of common good. 
 
 
From strategic actions and ideologies to emancipation from false necessities  
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The aim of social sciences is not to predict accurately, but to bring about desirable 
outcomes (cf. Sayer 2011). Accurate anticipations, when conceived counterfactually, 
can sometimes be helpful toward achieving this aim, depending on the net self-
altering effect. Because of the possibility of exploitation of predictions, we must also 
ask: what outcome is good or bad for whom; and what outcome is considered good or 
bad by whom and on what generalizable grounds? Reflexivity encourages us to 
replace mere prediction by scenarios of possible futures comprising different possible 
courses of action and policies by various actors, including “us” (whomever this “us” 
may be). When the reflexivity of predictions becomes transparent and publicly 
known, scenarios about possible futures become necessarily entangled with public 
ethico-political discourse about the problems and merits of different outcomes (for 
instance in terms of discourse ethics, see Apel 2001; and Habermas 1990). 
 
According to Merton’s analysis of self-fulfilling prophecies, behaviour based on false 
beliefs can generate a social situation that accords with those false beliefs. Now, 
social sciences are committed to truth. The task of social scientific explanation is to 
form a plausible and empirically confirmed true picture of geo-historical components 
and their relations. As social scientists, we evaluate negatively those parts of the 
institutional context that are responsible for the re-production of (self-fulfilling) false 
beliefs. (See Bhaskar 1998, 59-71; Patomäki 2002, 143-63). The type of situation that 
Merton describes is thus inherently problematical. One is justified in characterising a 
set of beliefs as “ideological” if both (i) many or all of those beliefs are false, that is, 
one possesses a superior explanation of the phenomena; and (ii) one possesses an 
explanation of the falsity of those beliefs and why they are held.  
 
Let me develop Merton’s example of a bank run a bit further. An actor may know the 
claim “bank X is unstable and is thus likely to collapse” to be false. It may still 
remain rational for her to participate in making the prediction come true. Either she 
believes that a sufficient number of actors believe the claim; or she believes that a 
sufficient number of actors believe that others believe it (see Lagerspetz 1988, 308-
9). There can be still higher levels, resembling Keynes’s famous beauty contest.9 Real 
world contradictions of this sort are not categorical because the outcome depends on 
contingent circumstances, in this case how many individuals are in fact intending to 
withdraw their savings simultaneously. Actors may nonetheless be trapped in an 
ideology sustained by lack of trust and suspicions about the motivation of others. 
This is a temporary and specific “ideology”, but it shows how false beliefs can lead to 
                                           
9 Keynes (1961/1936, 155-8) compared speculation to a newspaper beauty contest, in which the aim is not to compare 
and rank the beauty of the contestants as such but rather to forecast what features the average observer will find 
beautiful. There are different levels in this sort of competition: at the second level guesses are made as to what the first-
level players will decide, and the third-level players guess what the second-level players will decide, and so on. This 
description fits well to the activities of speculative finance – with the proviso that here the situation is of course more 
complicated, in that there are very many competitions going on all at once, each with a great many players and levels. 
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undesirable and unnecessary outcomes, which can be prevented by building better 
common institutions. The simplest institutional solution to this particular problem is 
deposit insurance. Experiences from bank runs during the Great Depression led to the 
introduction of deposit insurance in many countries.  
 
Reflexivity means the capacity of actors to reflect on their own conditions and place, 
accepting that both can change and be changed. Earlier I argued that a credible 
forecast of increased inflation can bring about both self-denying (monetary and 
financial countermeasures by the government and central bank) and self-fulfilling 
responses (workers increase wage demands, corporations increase prices). However, 
this underestimates the diversity of values and the powers of human reflexivity and 
freedom. Increased inflation is not necessarily a bad thing. The desirability of higher 
inflation depends on the base level, economic theories and values. Increasing 
inflation from 0% to 2% is desirable even from the point of view of the ECB. A 
Keynesian might argue for a higher rate, say around 5%. As a general rule low 
inflation favours lenders and those who possess money-capital; higher inflation 
favours debtors such as entrepreneurs and home-owners. Even when rising inflation 
is seen as a problem, relevant actors such as workers and corporations can be 
persuaded either to behave responsibly or to reach an agreement that counters the 
tendency toward prediction-accelerated cost-push inflation. This may, however, be 
difficult because of conflicts over income and power distribution.  
 
At this point reflexive ethico-political discourse moves to a deeper and more general 
level concerning the way social institutions should be organised. For instance, for 
John Rawls (1971, 3-4) “justice is the first virtue of social institutions”. Laws and 
institutions, no matter how efficient and well-arranged, “must be reformed or 
abolished if they are unjust”. What would be a just way of organising institutions of 
political economy? What is the proper rate of saving over time, how should the 
background institutions of taxation and property be arranged, and at what level is the 
social minimum or redistributive principles to be set? Within an institutional 
arrangement perceived as just and legitimate, it should be easier to behave 
responsibly and reach agreements about common good concerning for instance 
inflation.  
 
In some contrast to Rawls, however, it is also plausible to argue that because of the 
relativist nature of struggles between models and sentiments of justice, the first 
priority would be to organise public discourses and collective will-formation and 
decision-making democratically (see Perelman 1963; Patomäki 2006). Notably, some 
theories of justice emphasize the importance of democratic processes more than 
others. Schweickart (1993), for instance, argues that fairness is essentially (also) 
about deciding democratically upon economic rules and procedures and goals of 
economic institutions. He proposes a project of specifying a model of an 
economically feasible, morally desirable alternative to capitalism (ibid, 116). Hereby 
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we can see that deep behind the contingent predictability of responses lies the 
performativity of social and economic theories. Historically evolving and changing 
theories condition, shape and constitute those institutions on which the basic 
character and responsiveness of different actors depend.  
 
Instead of performativity, we could also talk about “ideational reflexivity” whereby 
“ideas about the economy reflect back on and affect or shape the evolving economy” 
(Mackinnon 2005, 6). Ideas can shape the construction of institutions as well as 
agendas and actions of economic actors and their responses to policy. Public 
discussion and debate about these ideas is at the heart of democratic political 
processes. Actors come to realise, reflexively, that the future is not something that 
just happens and can be predicted, but rather becomes increasingly something that the 
actors, including “us”, make of it.  
 
This is a learning process that occurs through reflexive feedback loops where also the 
course of real history influences participants’ views and theories. In the complex 
interdependent processes of world economy consisting of billions of actors, both 
individual and collective, and their structurally conditioned responses and 
collectively constituted modes of responsiveness, it is never possible to fully replace 
strategic actions and reflexive predictions with public discourses and common 
agreements. Rational economic policy will require at least some predictive capacities 
also in the future, and for this we must, in part, rely on contrastive demi-regularities 
and our knowledge about the structures and mechanisms that generate them, as well 
as on anticipation of actors’ responses including to policy changes and regime shifts. 
Yet the degree of human freedom can be increased by replacing particular 
unnecessary and often misrepresented causal sources of determination with more 
wanted and needed and also more clearly evident sources of causal determination. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In econometrics, a structural break, or structural change, is an unexpected shift in a 
time series that can lead to forecasting errors and general unreliability of the model. 
This definition refers to a specific technical function in econometric modelling. Data 
is nothing, however, more than external traces of internal contents. There are multiple 
layers of contradictory and complementary determination to which these traces owe 
their hidden unities, divergent meanings, and possible futures (Alker 1996, 351). The 
data is generated by (i) real causal complexes and (ii) data-coding, data-collection 
and dat-manipulation procedures. Not only these two layers but also econometric 
methods themselves can result in “structural breaks” in the technical sense of the 
term. What is interesting from a social scientific point of view are the real causal 
complexes consisting of actors, actions, rules, resources, practices and structures.  
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When a statistical measure or relationship changes from being a mere indicator to an 
object of policy for control purposes, its meaning changes. What is more, profit-
motivated capitalist firms and investors may change their expectations and find new 
opportunities in the newly defined situation, changing their agendas and behaviour 
accordingly. The announced policy-change can be seen as a self-altering prediction 
(or involving such a prediction), which is subject to contradictory and complementary 
determination, resulting either in net self-fulfilling or self-denying tendency. Whether 
the effect of these kinds of changes is strong enough to constitute a “structural break” 
at the level of econometrics, is contingent and can be tested, although we also know 
that the reliability of these tests is uncertain (the nature and quality of economic data 
sets definite limits to the use of these methods; e.g. Atkinson & Brandolini 2009).  
 
The changing and reflexive nature of reality has important policy-implications. What 
works and what does not work becomes a matter of timing and experimentalism. 
Take the Keynesian multiplier for instance. The multiplier is not a constant, not even 
in a given national “economy”. The multiplier can vary a lot over different phases of 
the business cycle and because of changes in policies, practices and institutions 
(policy can shape for instance the marginal propensity to consume). The overall 
multiplier can also be strengthened or dampened by the responses of other states and 
international organizations. These responses co-depend on reflexive anticipations of 
the effects of decreasing or increasing public expenditure for particular purposes. It is 
possible to try to persuade other states and international organizations either to 
behave responsibly or to reach an agreement that counters deflationary tendencies. 
What is “responsible” and when do “deflationary tendencies” prevail are dependent 
our understandings of political economy – and thus subject to public debates. 
 
The EU is an example of complex system of governance that relies on circular 
feedback loops and predictions that become easily self-fulfilling. The problem is that 
these loops are built on the assumption that the predicted outcome is negative (too 
much public debt) and that the prediction is net self-denying (cf. figure 3). In reality, 
the sustainable level of public debt is open to debate and predictions tend to be self-
fulfilling both through the financial disciplinary mechanism and multiplier effect. The 
underlying problem has to do with ideational reflexivity and the closed circle of 
operation of the efficient market hypothesis and likeminded theories (figure 2). The 
EU system of governance is thus, in part, premised on false beliefs that it then 
reproduces in a self-fulfilling manner. We should evaluate negatively those parts of 
the institutional context that are responsible for the re-production of (self-fulfilling) 
false beliefs. The undesirable and unnecessary outcomes could easily be prevented by 
building better common institutions (see Patomäki 2013, chapter 6-8). 
 
It is striking that there are regular patters in capitalist market economy, although it is 
changing and evolving over time, the boom-and-bust cycle being a case in point. In 
anticipation of the next global financial crisis and recession or depression, we may 
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also ask, what will happen to the EU as the circular feedback loops involving self-
fulfilling predictions remain in place. The EU governance system amplifies 
differences and changes. Thus, a negative shock is likely to lead to more divergent 
paths of development, strengthening the disintegrative tendencies within the Union 
(see Patomäki 2018, 122-7. However, neither a new global crisis nor the 
disintegration of the EU is necessary. The future is not something that just happens 
but rather something that actors, including “us”, make of it. 
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